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	That you approve the attac	hed message. Other	•
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By AT NARA Date 9/247

Bundesrepublik Deutschland der Bundeskanzler Bonn, den 20. November 1975

In the annex you will find a note on the essential points, which I discussed in Peking with Chairman Mao and Vice Prime Minister Teng Hsiao Ping.

Best regards

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His Excellency

The Secretary of State of the United States of America

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Washington, D.C.

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
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND DER BUNDESKANZLER Bonn, den 20. November 1975

1. My talk with Mao focused mainly on the role of the Soviet Union in world affairs. I told him that the Soviet Union had proceeded much more cautiously since the Cuba crisis than many of its political utterances suggested, and that a satisfactory balance of power should be maintained so as to give the Soviet Union no opportunity of exploiting its great power. The collective defence and deterrence capability of the Europeans with their ally the United States of America meant that the Soviet Union would be taking an enormous risk if it sought to exert pressure or became an aggressor. That defence capability, I said, provided us with enough room for manoeuvre vistis the Soviet Union and its allies which we could use in order to secure friendly relations with them as between good neighbours.

I informed Mao that our own position was more difficult than that of the other European nations because our country was divided and the old Reich capital was encompassed by the territory of a country that was under Soviet pressure. Although this situation could not be changed at present, I continued, we had not abandoned the hope of one day overcoming the present situation in such a way that the Germans would be able to live together again unter one roof. In the meantime we were trying to create a more friendly atmosphere. Nobody knew how the Soviet Union would develop in the next twenty years.

I told Mao that my conclusion from Clausewitz's doctrine that in war political leadership should have primacy over military leadership was that the ability to conduct war 2

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was only one of the alternatives open to political leaders. One should not be obsessed with the idea of war as the only possibility.

Mao was emphatic that there would be war with the Soviet Union. In his view eternal peaceful co-existence was inconceivable. Europe was too soft and divided, and on top of that had a mortal fear of war. He mentioned as examples the Danes, the Belgians and the Dutch. By comparison the Germans and the Yugoslavs were a little better. If Europe failed in the next ten years to achieve political, economic and military union it would suffer. The Europeans would have to learn to rely on themselves. Was it possible, he asked, that the 60 million West Germans could not achieve what the North Vietnamese had achieved?

In the event of war, he continued, defence was the est policy because the aggressor was usually the one who suffered defeat. This was documented by the American attack on Vietnam, William II's attack on France, and Hitler's attack on Europe. In each case the defender emerged victorious. It was exactly the same with Chiang Kai-shek, who had also been the aggressor.

The Americans were afraid of their people being killed. They had sent 500,000 troops to Vietnam, 50,000 of whom had been killed and over 100,000 wounded and they had made such a fuss about it.

In answer to my questions, Mao said that it was not his view of the Soviet Union but rather the Soviet Union itself that had changed. We were no longer dealing with men like Stalin but with the Khrushchevs and Brezhnevs, who were betrayers of Lenin. Hor, he said, would future generations of leaders return to Lenin's principles: "No, that they will not do, no, no!" They would not do so because they possessed too many nuclear weapons.

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I asked Mao's views on the role of Japan with its population of 120 million and he replied that Japan would not be capable of achieving anything. Sheer weight of numbers was not a reliable source of power; Japan hat neither oil, coal, iron nor food. He said it was true that Japan currently needed a strong alliance with the United States. The Japanese were relying on the United States but the latter was attempting to extend its protective umbrella in all directions, to cover Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, India, Australia, New Zealand and, indirectly, Thailand, the Middle East, Europe, America and Canada. In his opinion this would not work; the United States was trying "to hold ten fleas with ten fingers".

- 2. In his extensive appraisal of world affairs, Teng, too, was almost exclusively concerned with the Soviet Union. He said China did not think that détente or peace would be durable. Irrespective of the will of the people, there would be war and its roots lay in three factors:
 - the development of the system of socialist imperialism,
 - Soviet striving after world hegemony,
 - the growth of the Soviet military and economic potential.

A future war was likely to be conducted with conventional rather than nuclear weapons on account of the nuclear stalemate. That was why China appreciated the Federal Republic's efforts to build up its conventional forces. Only two powers were in a position to unleash a third world war - the United States would not risk this because it was concerned with consolidating the positions established since 1945, though it was no longer capable of doing so, so that war would originate in the Soviet Union.

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To China Europe was the focal point of world politics. It was also the point of orientation for Soviet strategy because world hegemony could only be achieved by the one who dominated Europe. The Peking Government were not afraid of a Soviet attack on China since this would not give the Soviets world hegemony. Seen from this point of view, China ; had no objection to the presence of US forces in Europe. The Chinese doubted, however, whether the US policy of appeasement for the Soviet Union would not lead to another Munich. It was an illusion to believe that the Soviet Union could be made dependent on the West by means of grain supplies, loans, and industrial plants. It was also a mistake to expect a change in Soviet policy after Brezhnev. The Chinese doubted whether the United States was prepared to defend Europe. Europe had to unite in order to be able to defend itself if necessary.

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On the situation in Asia, Teng remarked that it had developed favourably for America since the withdrawal of the United States from Indochina. The Soviet proposal for a conference on security in Asia hat not been well received. China's relations with Japan were not very favourable because the Japanese, apparently under Soviet pressure, were hesitating about the inclusion of an anti-hegemony clause in the proposed treaty of peace and friendship. Relations with India looked like improving.

With regard to the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Teng said Peking's impression was that the United States and the Soviet Union had struck similar notes there. The Soviet Union hat exploited the rise in oil prices in order to buy cheap cil from Iraq and sell it for three times as much in Europe. China did not understand the Soviet attitude at the special session of the General Assembly. After considering the matter she had assumed there were three reasons: First, the Soviet Union

was opposed to a change in the old economic order. Second, an increase in the price of commodities and oil would influence contradictions that had emerged among the COMECON States and alter relations between them. Third, the Chinese had heard from many sources that the Soviet Union was currently exporting oil to Eastern Europe but that as from 1980 it would become an importing country. He, Teng, did not know whether that was true. Perhaps the Soviet Union had thought that the higher price of oil would increase the price of imports for the industrial countries. All this could play a role, but the Chinese did not know enough about it.

3. I told Teng that

- the present world economic crisis impaired efforts to maintain world equilibrium because the Soviet Union was less severely affected by that crisis;
- in response to his assessment of the question of war between China and the Soviet Union I had to point out that the possibility of war between socialist States had also changed the situation as far as we were concerned;
- we did not need to be strengthened in our concern about the Soviet Union since it was the Soviet Union who had divided our country. And, apart from that, the Soviet Union itself was anxious about China;
- any country unleashing a world war would be running a risk that would have unforeseeable consequences for itself. That applied, I said, to both nuclear and conventional war;
- the Federal Republic of Germany had already fostered European unity at a time when no differences had yet arisen between Peking and Moscow;

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- China would have to know more about Europe and the United States, which was why I had invited Teng to visit the Federal Republic of Germany. A visit to the United States would also give him a broader basis for his appraisal.